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• Inequality has many linked dimensions: wages, 
incomes and consumption
• The literature on the first two types is huge
• The literature on consumption inequality is less 
developed, but growing.
• The link between the various types of inequality 
is mediated by multiple insurance mechanisms
• The amount of insurance available to consumers 
depends on the durability of income shocks
• The more persistent are income shocks, the 
lower is the amount of insuranceThis paper
• Uses the evolution of income and consumption 
inequality in the US to identify
– Income inequality due to permanent and transitory 
components
– Amount of insurance available with respect to the two 
type of shocks
• Fact # 1: Consumption inequality is lower than 
income inequality 
• Fact # 2: Income inequality grows more rapidly 
than consumption inequality
• This is true of US as well as other countriesFigure 1a: Income and Consumption Inequality, USA
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• Examination of inequality over time via consumption 
and income
– Studies from the BLS, Johnson and Smeeding (2005); early work 
in the US by Cutler and Katz (1992) and in the UK by Blundell 
and Preston (1991) and Atkinson (1997)
• Econometric work on the panel data decomposition of 
income processes
– MaCurdy(1982), Abowd and Card (1989), Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1995), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Guvenen (2006)
• Work on intertemporal consumption and insurance, 
especially on ‘excess’ insurance and excess sensitivity
– Hall and Mishkin (1982), Campbell and Deaton (1989), Cochrane 
(1991), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Krueger and Perri (2006), 
Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2006), Primiceri and Van 
Rens (2004), Attanasio and Pavoni (2006) The US case again
.
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Var. of log(C) CEX, smoothed Var. of log(C) CEXThe self-insurance model of 
consumption choices
• Individuals can self-insure using a simple credit market 
(risk-free bond)
• Consumption and income are linked through the 
intertemporal budget constraint
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• Individuals retire at L. Die with certainty at T. The only 
source of uncertainty is about income.Income dynamics
 P: Permanent component (a martingale)
 ε: Transitory component (an MA(q))
 Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) show how to identify the variances of 
the shocks in a general model with measurement error using panel
data (PSID)
 Here we allow the variances of the permanent and transitory 
components to vary non-parametrically with cohort, education and 
time.
 It follows from above that:
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• With CRRA preferences, the Euler equation is:
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• We show that this can be approximated by:
it it it t it it it it it Z C ξ ε π α ζ π ϑ + + + Δ + Γ ≈ Δ ' ln
Impatience, Precautionary 
savings, intertemporal
substitution
Deterministic preference shifts
Impact of permanent 
income shocks
Impact of transitory 
income shocks, α<1
ϑ ' ln it it it it Z C c Δ − Γ − Δ = Δ
• Define (unobserved) consumption growth:
Impact of 
shocks to 
higher 
income 
momentsSelf-insurance
• In this model, self-insurance is driven by the 
parameter π, which corresponds to the ratio of 
human capital wealth to total wealth (the sum 
of financial and human capital wealth)
• For given level of human capital wealth, past 
savings imply higher financial wealth today, and 
hence a lower value of π: Consumption responds 
less to income shocks (precautionary saving)
• Individuals approaching retirement have a lower 
value of π
• In the certainty-equivalence version of the PIH, 
π≈1 and α≈0Complete markets
• Under some circumstances, it is possible to insure 
consumption fully against income shocks
• In this case, π=0
• Theoretical problems: Moral hazard, Limited enforcement, 
ecc.
• Empirical problems: The hypothesis π=0 is soundly 
rejected (Cochrane, 1991; Attanasio and Davis, 1996; 
Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff, 1996).Partial Insurance
• It’s plausible that there is less insurance than 
predicted by the complete markets hypothesis
• It’s also plausible that there is more insurance 
than predicted by the permanent income 
hypothesis with just a risk-free bond
• Attanasio and Pavoni (2005) consider an 
economy with moral hazard and hidden asset 
accumulation - individuals now have hidden 
access to a simple credit market. They show 
that, depending on the cost of shirking and the 
persistence of the income shock, some partial 
insurance is possible. A linear insurance rule can 
be obtained as an ‘exact’ solution in a dynamic 
Mirrlees model with CRRA utility.Insurance to Transitory and 
Permanent Shocks
• Adjustment in assets
• Redistributive mechanisms: social insurance, transfers, 
progressive taxation
– Gruber; Gruber and Yelowitz; Blundell and Pistaferri; Kniesner
and Ziliak
• Family and interpersonal networks
– Kotlikoff and Spivak; Attanasio and Rios-Rull
• Individual and household labor supply
– Stephens; Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante; Attanasio, Low 
and Sanchez-Marcos
• Durable replacement
– Browning and Crossley
• Implicit contracts between employers and employees
– Guiso, Pistaferri and SchivardiConsumption dynamics with partial 
insurance
• In this notation, φ and ψ subsume π and α from the self-insurance 
model
• Need panel data on consumption and income to identify the 
parameters of interest
– CEX
• Provides consumption and income, but it’s not a panel
– PSID
• Provides panel data on income, but limited information on consumption 
(food)
it it t it t it c ξ ε ψ ζ φ + + ≈ Δ
Partial insurance coefficient 
w.r.t. permanent shocks, 0≤φ ≤1
Partial insurance coefficient 
w.r.t. transitory shocks, 0≤ψ≤1How to “create” panel data on 
consumption in the PSID
• We create a “mapping” from food consumption to 
non-durable consumption
• The “mapping” is a demand function for food
it t it t it it e p C Z f + + + = ν β γ ' ln ln ' ln
• This demand function can be estimated consistently using  
CEX data
• It can be inverted in the PSID using the estimates from 
the CEX to obtain an imputed measure of non-durable 
consumption
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variances
• From our income-consumption model we have a set of 
covariance restrictions (allowing for measurement error)
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• A useful decomposition:
An increase in insurance (for 
given inequality)
An increase in inequality (for 
given insurance)
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) it t t it it t t it it c ε ψ ψ ε ζ φ φ ζ var var var var var
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ Δ − − − − 4 43 4 42 1 4 43 4 42 1Results
Whole sample George W. 
Bush cohort 
(born 1940s) 
Donald 
Rumsfeld cohort 
(born 1930s)
Low educ. High educ.
Var. measur. error 0.0632
(0.0032)
0.0582
(0.0049)
0.0609
(0.0061)
0.0753
(0.0055)
0.0501
(0.0032)
Var. preference shocks 0.0122
(0.0038)
0.0151
(0.0064)
0.0164
(0.0073)
0.0117
(0.0067)
0.0156
(0.0042)
Coeff. partial insur. 
perm. shock (φ)
0.6167
(0.1118)
0.7445
(0.2124)
0.5626
(0.2535)
0.8211
(0.2232)
0.3262
(0.0867)
Coeff. partial insur. 
trans. shock (ψ)
0.0550
(0.0358)
0.0845
(0.0657)
0.0215
(0.0592)
0.0869
(0.0517)
0.0437
(0.0513)
P-value test equal φ 33% 16% 45% 81% 2%
P-value test equal ψ 58% 43% 14% 46% 14%Variance permanent shocks
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• We find that the amount of insurance has not changed over this period 
(Krueger and Perri), i.e., Δφt=0, Δψt=0
• In the first half of the sample period, Δvar(ζ)>0 and Δvar(ε)≈0, and thus
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• In the second half of the sample period the opposite is true, Δvar(ζ)=0 
and Δvar(ε)>0, and since ψ≈0,
( ) 0 var ≈ Δ Δ it c
• Level effects - excess smoothness.
• But excess smoothness is not a spurious phenomenon: We don’t find it 
exactly where we don’t expect it to be, e.g., among low educated, low 
wealth, low initial income individuals.Where is insurance coming from? (1)
• Family and interpersonal networks
Baseline Excluding private 
transfers
φ 0.6167
(0.1118)
0.6531
(0.1187)
ψ 0.0550
(0.0358)
0.0532
(0.0359)
• Wealth accumulation, Initial income
Baseline High initial 
wealth sample
Low initial 
wealth sample
Low initial wealth 
sample, use total 
consumption
Including SEO 
sub-sample
0.9589
(0.3696)
0.6840
(0.1001)
0.1339
(0.0332)
0.5567
(0.1076)
0.2800
(0.0896)
0.7800
(0.3131)
0.4159
(0.1153)
0.0165
(0.0357)
Including 
younger 
households
φ 0.6167
(0.1118)
0.7112
(0.1189)
ψ 0.0550
(0.0358)
0.0592
(0.0421)Where is insurance coming from? (2)
• Transfers and Family labor supply
Baseline Excluding transfers Excluding and 
transfers and spouse’s 
earnings
0.4668
(0.0977)
0.2902
(0.0611)
0.0436
(0.0291)
0.0574
(0.0286)
φ 0.6167
(0.1118)
ψ 0.0550
(0.0358)Misleading evidence (1)
• Suppose we ignore the distinction between permanent 
and transitory shocks
• The partial insurance coefficient is now a weighted 
average of the coefficients of partial insurance φ and ψ, 
with weights given by the importance of the variance of 
permanent (transitory) shocks on the overall variance of 
income growth
• This weight grows in the first period and falls in the 
second
• Thus, one will have the impression that insurance is 
growing
• But this is misleading. What is growing is not the 
availability of insurance, but the relative importance of 
more insurable shocks.Misleading evidence (2)
• Suppose we replicate the same analysis using food data
• This means there’s no need to impute
• The coefficients of partial insurance now are the product 
of two things: partial insurance of non-durable 
consumption and the budget elasticity of food 
consumption
• In the data, these coefficients fall over time, i.e., one 
finds evidence that insurance has increased
• But this assumes that the budget elasticity of food 
consumption is constant over time
• But this is wrong! In the data, this elasticity falls over 
time
• Thus, what is a decline in the relative importance of food 
in overall non-durable consumption is interpreted as an 
increase in the insurance of consumption with respect to 
income shocksAnticipation
• We find little evidence of anticipation.
• This suggests the shocks that were experienced 
in the 1980s were not anticipated. 
• These were largely changes in the returns to 
skills, shifts in government transfers and the 
shift of insurance from firms to workers. 
Test cov(Δyt+1, Δct) = 0 for all t: p-value 0.3305
Test cov(Δyt+2, Δct) = 0 for all t: p-value 0.6058
Test cov(Δyt+3, Δct) = 0 for all t: p-value 0.8247
Test cov(Δyt+4, Δct) = 0 for all t: p-value 0.7752Conclusions
• The link between income and consumption inequality depends on two 
things:
– Durability of income shocks
– Insurance against them
• In the USA, in the early 1980s the increase in inequality is of permanent 
nature; later, it is of transitory nature
• Our evidence suggests insurance against the two types of shocks over 
this period hasn’t changed
• If institutional changes have occurred, they have worked in opposite 
directions
– Financial and insurance market development
– Risk shifting from firms and governments to workers
• The level of consumption inequality is lower than that of income 
inequality
– Part of the income shocks is transitory, and most families use savings/access 
to credit to insure them (but not the poor). Another important role is played 
by family labor supply.
– About 30% of permanent shocks are insured (but not for the poor or the low 
educated). An important insurance role is played by the tax system and 
welfare state (disability insurance, social security, food stamps, etc.). 
• The changes in consumption inequality are due to changes in the nature 
of income shocks (more permanent at first, more transitory later on)References
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